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WHO IS SECURE?: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ARIZONA v. GANT
David S. Chase*
In April 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant narrowed the
scope of an automobile search incident to arrest. Priorto Gant, officers
were permitted to search the entire automobile passenger compartment
incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupantfor any offense. The Gant Court
rejected this broad interpretation and limited officers' ability to search to
two circumstances: (1) when an arresteeis unsecured and within reaching
distance of the vehicle or (2) when it is reasonablefor officers to believe the
vehicle might contain evidence related to the crime of the arrest. The Gant
decision raises several new issues including the circumstances required to
consider an arrestee secure. Is an arrestee considered unsecure until
officers place the arrestee in a police car? Can an arrestee be considered
secure if officers do not handcuff the arrestee? How many officers are
requiredto secure an arrestee? What are the relevantfactors to consider?
Since the Supreme Court decided Gant, numerous lower courts have
cited Gant to determine whether officers secured an arresteeprior to an
automobile search incident to arrest. This Note examines how lower courts
have inconsistently applied the "secure" aspect of the holding.
Additionally, this Note offers a test for determining whether officers have
securedan arrestee under Gant in order to clarify the inconsistency among
lower courts, to ensure that defendants receive equal treatment, and to
prevent confusion among law enforcement officials.
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INTRODUCTION

Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional
standards over the last 50 years as that of the search "incident to an
arrest." There has been a remarkable instability in this whole area ....
- Justice Byron White1

Consider the following two hypothetical fact patterns. John drove his car
on a highway on the East Coast of the United States in the middle of the
afternoon. An officer observed John driving twenty miles per hour above
the speed limit, and the officer pulled him over. The officer asked John for
his license and registration, but John's license had expired three months
prior. As a result, the officer directed John to exit the vehicle and placed
John under arrest. The officer handcuffed John and led him to the back of
the vehicle. After leaving John with another officer at the rear of the
vehicle, the officer searched John's car and discovered a bag containing
marijuana. The officer charged John with driving with a suspended license
and marijuana possession. At trial, the judge admitted the marijuana as
evidence, and the jury convicted John on both charges.
The same day officers arrested John on the East Coast, Mike drove his
car on a West Coast highway. One of the brake lights on Mike's vehicle
did not function properly, and an officer pulled him over. The officer asked
Mike for his license and registration. However, Mike's license had expired
six months prior. Similar to John's arrest, the officer directed Mike to exit
the car. The officer handcuffed Mike and led him to the rear of the vehicle.
After leaving Mike at the back of the vehicle with another officer, the
officer searched Mike's car and discovered a bag of cocaine. The officer
charged Mike with driving without a license and cocaine possession.
However, unlike John, at Mike's trial the judge suppressed the cocaine, and
the jury found Mike not guilty of drug possession.
Why did one judge admit the evidence and another judge suppress the
evidence? Why did the defendants receive unequal treatment? Why were
the officers permitted to search one vehicle but not the other vehicle? How
are these results fair?
In light of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Arizona v. Gant,2 the
inconsistent results of these two hypotheticals are plausible. While such
disparate holdings have not yet emerged, in the aftermath of Gant, courts
have begun to interpret the new decision inconsistently.
Gant established a new standard for warrantless automobile searches
incident to arrest. 3 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, subject to several exceptions. 4 One exception is a
search incident to a lawful arrest, which permits officers to search an
1.
2.
3.
4.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
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arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's control in order to
protect the officers and prevent the destruction of evidence. 5 The Supreme
Court applied this exception to the automobile context in New York v.
Belton. 6 Following Belton, a majority of lower courts interpreted the
holding to permit officers to conduct a search of the passenger compartment
7
of an automobile whenever officers arrested an occupant for any offense.
In Gant, the Supreme Court rejected the broad reading of Belton, and
narrowed the automobile search incident to arrest exception to two
circumstances: (1) "when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search ' 8 or (2) if it
is ".reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
9
found in the vehicle.'
Since the Supreme Court issued Gant in April 2009, lower courts have
cited the opinion over 400 times as they interpret and implement the new
standard.' 0 This Note examines lower courts' inconsistent applications of
the "unsecured and within reaching distance" 11 Gant justification.
Furthermore, this Note offers a test for determining whether officers have
secured an arrestee under Gant in order to resolve the inconsistency among
lower courts, to ensure that defendants receive equal treatment, and to
prevent confusion among law enforcement officials.
Part I of this Note discusses the search incident to arrest exception and
the application of the exception to the automobile context. This part also
reviews the requirements of an arrest, police officer considerations, and the
new automobile search incident to arrest standard under Gant. Part II
reviews several lower court decisions since Gant and examines how lower
courts have inconsistently applied the "secure" aspect of the holding.
Finally, Part III offers an analysis for determining whether officers secured
an arrestee before conducting an automobile search incident to arrest.
Whether officers secured an arrestee is relevant because, under Gant,
officers are not permitted to search an automobile incident to arrest after
securing the arrestee unless the officers reasonably believe they might
2
discover evidence related to the arrest in the vehicle.'
I. AUTOMOBILE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION

Part I discusses the underlying concepts relevant to the automobile search
incident to arrest exception. In Part I.A, this Note reviews the development
of the search incident to arrest standard. Part I.B analyzes how the Supreme
5. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63).
6. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
7. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718; see infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
8. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
9. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
10. This figure includes cases reported in Lexis Sheppard's report through February 19,
2010.
11. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
12. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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Court applied the search incident to arrest exception to the automobile
context in Belton. 13
Next, Part LC examines how lower courts
implemented the Belton holding. In Part I.D, this Note reviews the new
automobile search incident to arrest standard established in Gant. Part I.E
discusses how police officers perform searches incident to arrest and the
importance of officer safety. Finally, Part I.F reviews the requirements and
various interpretations of an arrest.
A. Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Part L.A reviews the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, and the
development of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. This section also examines the current search incident to
arrest standard.
1. Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches. 14 The Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 15 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Amendment to bar warrantless searches of items to which
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 6 However, the
Fourth Amendment does not bar a reasonable search to accomplish a
legitimate governmental purpose. 17
The exclusionary rule bars the government from introducing evidence
18
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States 19 for federal prosecutions 20 and applied the rule to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio.2 1 The Supreme Court has
explained on numerous occasions that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter authorities from conducting unreasonable searches. 22 Over time
the Court has offered other justifications for the exclusionary rule including

13. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
14. See THOMAS K. CLANCY,
INTERPRETATION 118 (2008).

THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT:

ITS HISTORY

AND

15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See CLANCY, supra note 14, at 60.

17. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31 (2001); CLANCY, supra note 14, at
xix.
18. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 13.

19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. Id. at 393-94, 398 (excluding evidence of illegal gambling at trial since authorities
obtained the evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
21. 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961); CLANCY, supra note 14, at 340 & n.12.
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (noting the purpose of the rule is to deter);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965) (noting the rule discourages unlawful police
action).
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preventing the public from losing trust in the government 23 and maintaining
judicial integrity. 24 The Supreme Court has established exceptions to the
warrant requirement, including a search incident to arrest, discussed in the
following section.
2. Development of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Although a warrantless search is not permitted under the Fourth
Amendment, there are several exceptions 25 to this rule, including a search
incident to a lawful arrest. 2 6 This exception evolved during the first half of
the twentieth century as the Supreme Court issued numerous rulings on the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. 2 7 These holdings did not
provide a clear standard and repeatedly expanded and limited the
28
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest.
In 1950, the Supreme Court in United States v. Rabinowitz29 again
expanded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, holding that
the test for whether a search is valid "is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." 30 In
23. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
the exclusionary rule prevents the government from benefiting at trial from illegally obtained
evidence, "thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government").
24. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (noting that courts should not
serve as "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold"). However, the Court's view has evolved, and the Court now seems to consider
deterrence of police misconduct to be the critical justification. See CLANCY, supra note 14, at
620 & n.42 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 610 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that unwarranted searches
are unreasonable "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions").
26. See CLANCY, supra note 14, at 340.
27. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (limiting scope of search
incident to arrest by suppressing evidence seized during a warrantless search since officers
had failed to obtain a search warrant even though they had sufficient time to obtain one);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947) (expanding permissible scope of search by
admitting evidence obtained during a general search of suspect's apartment); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-67 (1932) (holding facts distinguishable from prior cases
and failing to apply the search incident to arrest exception); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931) (failing to apply the search incident to arrest exception
because the facts were distinguishable from prior cases); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 199 (1927) (holding evidence officers recovered that was unrelated to the search
warrant was admissible because the officers recovered the evidence incident to a lawful
arrest); Aguello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (noting in dicta that officers could
search the place of arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (noting
officers were permitted to search the area within the arrestee's control incident to a lawful
arrest); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (discussing in dicta that officers
may search the suspect after a legal arrest).
28. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 355-56; Lonna Hooks, Exceptions to Requirement of a
Search Warrant, Incident to a Lawful Arrest, District of Columbia Court of Appeals Project
on Criminal Procedure,26 How. L.J. 919, 922-26 (1983) ("The next few years [1927-50]
were to bring about numerous variations in and expansions of the right and scope of a search
incident to a lawful arrest.").
29. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
30. Id. at 66.
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Rabinowitz, officers suspected the defendant of possessing forged stamps
and arrested the defendant at his office. 31 The officers failed to obtain 32a
search warrant, but searched the defendant's desk, safe, and cabinets.
During the search, officers discovered over 500 forged stamps. 33 The
Supreme Court admitted the stamps and held that the search was reasonable
since officers searched the area under Rabinowitz's contro 3 4 and the search
related to the crime of the arrest. 35 As implemented by lower courts,
Rabinowitz permitted a warrantless search incident to arrest of any area
36
within the arrestee's possession or control.
3. Current Search Incident to Arrest Standard: Chimel v. California
The evolution of the search incident to arrest exception culminated in the
1969 Supreme Court decision Chimel v. California.37 In Chimel, officers
executed an arrest warrant at the defendant's house in connection with the
defendant's alleged robbery of a coin store. 38 The officers requested the
39
defendant's consent to search the house, but the defendant refused.
Nevertheless, the officers told the defendant they were permitted to search
the house "on the basis of the lawful arrest," even though the officers had
not obtained a warrant to search the defendant's house.40 The officers
searched the defendant's entire house including three bedrooms, the attic,
garage, and workshop.4 1 After completing the roughly one-hour search of
the house, the officers seized numerous items including coins, medals, and
2
tokens.4
In determining whether the officers conducted a valid search, the Court
reviewed the legal basis of the Rabinowitz search incident to arrest
standard. 4 3 The Court noted that there were serious questions concerning
the case law upon which the Rabinowitz Court based the holding. 44 Indeed,
the Court stressed that the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment
31. Id. at 58-59.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 59.
34. Carson Emmons, Comment, Arizona v. Gant: An Argument for Tossing Belton and
All Its Bastard Kin, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1067, 1074 (2004).

35. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61-65.
36. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969) (discussing how lower courts
interpreted United States v. Rabinowitz).
37. 395 U.S. 752; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 28, 2002, at 1321 (2004).
38. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 753-54.
41. Id. at 754.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 755-62.
44. Id. at 760 (discussing that the legal basis for the Rabinowitz search incident to arrest
standard was based on a "'hint' contained in Weeks [that] was, without persuasive
justification, 'loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision."' (quoting United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
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did not support the Rabinowitz standard.4 5 The drafters of the Fourth
Amendment sought to protect privacy by "interpos[ing] a magistrate
between the citizen and the police. . . . so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law." 46 The
Court held the Rabinowitz standard failed to satisfy this privacy
requirement since it permitted a warrantless search incident to arrest of
areas beyond the arrestee's immediate control without sufficient
47
justification.
In crafting the new search incident to arrest standard, the Supreme Court
48
reviewed the then-recent decision regarding stop and frisks, Terry v. Ohio.
In Terry, the Supreme Court stressed the presumption that warrants are
required prior to conducting a search 49 and that any search must be tied
directly to the circumstances that initiated the search. 50 The Court
sustained the officer's unwarranted search in Terry since the protective
search for weapons was limited in scope to52 discover weapons to ensure
officer safety 5 1 and was not a general search.
With the Terry holding in mind, the Supreme Court in Chimel overruled
Rabinowitz53 and set forth the twin rationales for a search incident to
arrest. 54 Under Chimel, when officers arrest a suspect, the officers may
search the area within an arrestee's immediate control in order to (1)
remove weapons that might be used against the officers 5 5 or (2) to prevent
concealment or destruction of evidence. 56 Courts have considered several
factors in determining whether an area is within an arrestee's immediate
control for the purposes of Chimel.57 Courts examine the distance between
45. Id. ("Nor is the rationale by which the State seeks here to sustain the search of the
petitioner's house supported by a reasoned view of the background and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment."); see also CLANCY, supra note 14, at 40-42.
46. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
47. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
48. 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding officers are permitted to conduct brief
investigatory stops if they reasonably suspect that an individual is involved in criminal
activity, and for their protection the officers may perform limited protective searches for
weapons without a warrant).
49. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
50. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-31.
52. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29); cf id. (citing Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-67 (1968)) (invalidating a search that discovered drugs since the
search was not a protective search limited in scope to discover weapons).
53. Id. at 768.
54. See id. at 762-63.
55. Id.; see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing twin rationales for the Chimel v. Californiaholding); see also Hooks, supra note
28, at 929-30. An arrest does not require officers to completely subdue the arrestee, and
thus the arrestee may still pose a threat to officers. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying
text.
56. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63; Belton, 453 U.S. at 464-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing Chimel's twin rationales); see also Hooks, supra note 28, at 929-30.
57. David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton's Per Se Rule Governing the
Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1287, 1312-16
(2005).
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the arrestee and the area the officers searched; 58 whether officers restrained
or handcuffed the arrestee; 59 the ratio of police officers to arrestees; 60 the
physical positioning of the officers in relation to the arrestee and the area
62
searched;6 1 and whether the arrestee could have easily accessed the area.
B. Automobile Searches Incident to Arrest: New York v. Belton
The following section discusses how the Supreme Court applied the
search incident to arrest standard to the automobile context in New York v.
Belton.63 Prior to Belton, courts had inconsistently applied the search
incident to arrest exception to automobile searches. 64 Belton established
that officers were permitted to search the entire passenger compartment of
65
an automobile incident to an arrest.

58. Id. at 1313 & n.164 (collecting cases where the court considered, inter alia, the
distance between arrestee and area searched including United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 69,
73 (5th Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 18 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1994) (invalidating search of
briefcase eight feet away from arrestee), and State v. Taylor, 875 So. 2d 962, 968 (5th Cir.
2004) (admitting evidence obtained during search of pants found at the foot of the arrestee's
bed)).
59. Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1313 & n.165 (collecting cases where the court
considered, inter alia, whether officers handcuffed arrestee, including United States v.
Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding area searched not in arrestee's immediate
control since officers handcuffed arrestee)). But see Commonwealth v. Netto, 783 N.E.2d
439, 446-47 (Mass. 2003) (upholding search after officers placed arrestee in handcuffs).
60. Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1313-14 & n.166 (collecting cases where the court
considered, inter alia, the arrestee-to-officer ratio, including United States v. Blue, 78 F.3d
56, 60 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding search invalid on the ground that the area searched was not in
the control of the two arrestees due in part to the presence of four officers), and
Commonwealth v. Van Jordan, 456 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding search
valid on the ground that area searched was in control of arrestees since arrestees
outnumbered officers)).
61. Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1314-15 & n.167 (collecting cases where the court
considered, inter alia, positioning of arrestees and officers in determining whether area was
in arrestee's immediate control, including United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1066 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding area searched within arrestees' immediate control since the two arrestees
sat next to the area searched, and the officers were not positioned between area searched and
arrestees), and United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding area searched
not within arrestees' immediate control since officer stood between arrestee and area
searched)).
62. Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1315 & n.168 (collecting cases where the court
considered, inter alia, arrestee's ability to access area searched, including Parra,2 F.3d at
1066 (holding arrestees could easily access pillow on bed and thus the pillow was in
arrestee's immediate control), and Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 723 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984) (holding automobile's trunk not in arrestee's immediate control since officers
possessed keys to locked trunk)).
63. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
64. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1980)
(upholding warrantless automobile search incident to arrest), and United States v. Dixon,
558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977) (same), and United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 669-70
(5th Cir. 1973) (same), with United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1980)
(invalidating warrantless automobile search incident to arrest), and United States v. Benson,
631 F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1980) (same).
65. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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In Belton, an officer stopped a speeding vehicle containing four men on
the New York State Thruway. 66 Upon asking the driver of the vehicle for
his driver's license and vehicle registration, the officer smelled marijuana
and discovered that none of the four men owned the vehicle or were related
to the owner of the vehicle. 67 Further, the officer saw an envelope labeled
"Supergold" on the vehicle floor that he associated with marijuana. 68 The
officer directed the four men to exit the vehicle, and arrested them for
marijuana possession. 69 The officer separated the men along the highway,
read them their Miranda rights, 70 and searched each arrestee. 7 1 The officer
then searched the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle, and
discovered cocaine within one of the pockets of Belton's jacket located on
the back seat. 72 Belton was indicted for possession of a controlled
substance, and he moved to suppress the cocaine arguing the search violated
73
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In determining whether the search of Belton's vehicle was valid, the
Supreme Court established a bright-line rule regarding automobile searches
incident to arrest. 74 The Court noted that Chimel justified a search incident
to arrest under two rationales-evidence preservation and officer safety-75
but limited the search to the area within the arrestee's immediate control.
The Court applied this standard to the automobile context and held that the
area in an arrestee's immediate control included any area within the
passenger compartment of the vehicle. 76 Thus "when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile." 77 Further, the Court held that officers

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring officers to advise a suspect

in custody of his right to remain silent prior to questioning the suspect).
71. Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 459-60 (noting that courts have reached different results in similar fact
patterns and that a clear rule is desirable to resolve confusion among police authorities and
the public); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 37, at 1322; David M. Silk,
Comment, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 281, 288 (1987) (noting state and lower courts were split regarding the proper scope of
an automobile search incident to arrest).
75. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-58 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969)).
76. Id. at 460 ("Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."' (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763)); DAVID S.
RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.06[4][b], at 2-227 to 2-233 (2009)
(discussing how the court applied Chimel to the automobile context).
77. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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may search any containers discovered
within the passenger compartment
78
whether they were open or closed.
The Court established a bright-line rule regarding automobile searches
incident to arrest for several reasons. Police officers are not legal
scholars, 79 and bright-line rules provide officers clear guidance for
determining when a search or arrest is permissible. 80 Officers only have a
limited time to decide whether to arrest a suspect, and, as opposed to
nuanced legal rules, officers can easily apply bright-line rules without
extensive analysis. 8 1 The average citizen also benefits from bright-line
82
rules since such rules inform the citizen of his or her constitutional rights.
Further, easy-to-apply bright-line rules are preferable to difficult-to-apply
complicated rules. 8 3 As discussed by one commentator, "a readily
understood and easily applied rule which would bring about the
theoretically correct conclusion 90% of the time,"84 is preferred over "a
complicated rule which in a theoretical sense produces the desired result
100% of the time, but which well-intentioned police could be expected to
apply correctly in only 75% of the cases." 85 Indeed, "an ounce of
86
application is worth a ton of abstraction."
78. Id. at 460-61.
79. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amicus CuriaeNational Association of Police
Organizations, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 7, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
(No. 07-542) ("Law enforcement officers ... are not generally possessed of a recent law
degree .... Our nation's officers face an already challenging task in learning, knowing and
remembering the many rules and exceptions that control their enforcement and investigative
activities. They surely do not need to have the bright-line rule of Belton and Thornton
replaced with an amorphous contingency.").
80. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) ("A single, familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.").
81. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A police officer's
determination [whether to search] a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each
instance into an analysis of each step in the search."); Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication " Versus "StandardizedProcedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT.
REv. 127, 141 ("A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of
heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
'literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."' (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting))).
82. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60 ("When a person cannot know how a court will apply a
settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his
constitutional protection .... ").
83. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
"BrightLines " and "GoodFaith," 43 U. Prr. L. REv. 307, 321 (1982).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. But see Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45
U. PTr. L. REv. 227, 231 (1984) ("[C]ategorical fourth amendment rules often lead to
substantial injustice; in addition, their artificiality commonly makes them difficult, not easy,
to apply."); LaFave, supra note 83, at 325-26 (discussing questions courts should review
before creating bright-line rules).
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In dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., argued that the majority had
abandoned Chimel's twin rationales of officer safety and evidence
preservation in favor of a bright-line rule. 87 In Justice Brennan's view, the
majority had endorsed a fiction by holding "that the interior of a car is
always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in
the car." 88 In contrast to the majority's bright-line rule for determining the
area within an arrestee's immediate control, Justice Brennan advocated for
a more nuanced and fact-specific approach. 89 The test promoted by Justice
Brennan would weigh several factors, including "the relative number of
police officers and arrestees, the manner of restraint placed on the arrestee,
and the ability of the arrestee to gain access to a particular area or
container." 90
C. Implementation of New York v. Belton
The following section discusses how lower courts implemented the
Belton holding. The first section reviews how a majority of lower courts
broadly interpreted Belton, permitting an automobile search incident to any
arrest. The second section discusses the minority of holdings, which either
declined to follow Belton or applied a narrower interpretation of Belton that
was more consistent with Chimel.
1. Broad Interpretations
Most lower courts broadly interpreted the Belton holding. 91 Indeed,
Belton was "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant even if there [was] no possibility the arrestee
could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. ' 92 Whether
Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton influenced lower courts, 93 many lower
courts clearly applied the holding broadly. 94 Lower courts upheld
87. Belton, 453 U.S. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 466.
89. See id. at 471; see also Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1360 (advocating against a per se

rule and arguing that an automobile search incident to arrest should only be permissible
when "the interior of the vehicle is actually within the immediate control of the arrestee at
the time of the search").
90. Belton, 453 U.S. at 471. Prior to Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), Professor
David Rudstein argued for a reexamination of New York v. Belton and a return to the Chimel
rationale advocated for in Justice Brennan's dissent. See Rudstein, supra note 57, at 135060.
91. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
92. Id. at 1718.
93. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan argued that under
the majority opinion, an automobile search would be permitted incident to any arrest since
the majority held an arrestee always had immediate control over the automobile's passenger
compartment, Belton, 453 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and "'the result would
presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in
the patrol car' before conducting the search." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718 (quoting Belton, 453
U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
94. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
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automobile searches incident to arrest conducted after officers handcuffed
96
the suspect, 9 5 or even after officers secured the suspect in a police car.
Further, courts permitted searches of locked containers such as glove
compartments during a search incident to arrest even though the suspect
would never be able to access the items contained in the locked
97
containers.
2. Narrow Interpretations
In United States v. Vasey, 9 8 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit declined to follow other federal courts and instead applied a narrow
interpretation of Belton. In Vasey, an officer observed the defendant
speeding in a vehicle and pulled him over.9 9 The officer requested the
defendant's license and radioed another officer to perform a warrants
check.10 0 The warrants check showed an outstanding warrant for a drug
offense, and the officer arrested the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed
him in the police car. 10 1 The officer asked the defendant for consent to
search the vehicle, and the defendant refused. 10 2 Another officer arrived,
and the two officers partially searched the defendant's vehicle thirty 103
to
forty-five minutes after the officer placed the defendant in the police car.
The trial court convicted the defendant based upon the evidence discovered
04
during the search. 1
The defendant appealed the conviction, and the Ninth Circuit held the
search invalid. 10 5 The court noted that Belton applied Chimel's search
incident to arrest standard to the automobile context and that such searches
were limited to the area within the arrestee's control. 10 6 In determining
whether the car was within the arrestee's control, the court reviewed United
States v. McConney'017 for factors to consider including "the number of
persons being arrested, the number of officers present, the officer(s)'
physical positioning with regard to the arrestee and the place searched, the
95. RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.06[4][b], at 2-237 & n.148; see also United States v.

Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006); State v. Canezaro, 957 So. 2d 136, 140
(La. 2007).
96. RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.06[4][b], at 2-237 & n.149; see also United States v.

Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 968 (6th Cir. 1993).
97. RUDSTEN, supra note 76, § 2.06[41[b], at 2-236 & nn.142-43; see also United States
v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868,
872 (8th Cir. 1985).
98. 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987).

99. Id. at 784.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

104. Id. at 785.
105. Id. at 787-88.
106. Id. at 786 (noting the court adhered "to the narrow scope of the search incident to
arrest exception espoused in Chimer').
107. 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The search in United States v. McConney was not a
vehicle search; the officers searched the defendant in his home. Id. at 1198.

2590

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

display of guns by the officers, and the distance between the arrestee and
the place searched. ' 10 8 In applying the McConney factors, the Vasey court
found the officers did not limit the search to the area within the defendant's
control since the search occurred after the officers handcuffed 0 9 the
defendant and placed him in a police vehicle, two armed officers performed
the search, and the officers had ensured that the defendant could not escape
the vehicle. 110 Thus, unlike other federal courts, the Ninth Circuit did not
broadly interpret Belton and, instead, applied an analysis more consistent
with Chimel.
Similar to Vasey, several state supreme courts declined to apply a broad
Belton interpretation."' For example, in Commonwealth v. White, 112 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court narrowly applied Belton. 113 In White, officers
received an anonymous tip that White sold illegal drugs.ll 4 The officers
placed White under surveillance and stopped him in his automobile. 1 5 The
officers removed White from the vehicle, patted him down for weapons,
moved him ten feet from the vehicle, then positioned an officer between
him and the vehicle. 1 6 After removing White from the vehicle, two
officers partially entered the vehicle and saw a marijuana cigarette on the
front console and a brown paper bag containing cocaine between the front
seats. 117
The court ruled the vehicle search illegal, stressing that incident to arrest
officers may only search "the arrestee's person and the area in which the
person is detained in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons
or destroying evidence.""8 Here, the officers removed White from the
vehicle, White stood ten feet from the vehicle, and an officer stood between
White and the vehicle. 19 Since the court found that under those
108. Vasey, 834 F.2d at 787 (citing McConney, 728 F.2d at 1207).

109. But see id. at 787-88 ("We do not hold that once an arrestee is handcuffed, all rights
to search the vehicle vanish. Rather, the circumstances of the arrest dictate whether the
search was proper and conducted contemporaneously with the arrest.").
110. Id. at 787 ("It was readily apparent to the officers and to this, court that [the
defendant] had virtually no opportunity to reach into his vehicle at the time the search
occurred. . . . Chimel does not allow the officers to presume that an arrestee is
superhuman.").
111. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 906 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J.,
concurring) (citing state courts that "have refused to follow Belton"); see also State v.
Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); State v. Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 40-41 (Nev.
1993) (Steffen, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 963 (N.J. 1994); State v.
Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992); Eugene L. Shapiro, New York v. Belton and State
Constitutional Doctrine, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 141-65 (2002); J. Tim Thomas, Note,
Belton Is Not Welcome: Idaho's Rejection and Subsequent Adoption of the Belton Rule in

State v. Charpentier, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 125, 135 & n.100 (1998).
112. 669 A.2d 896.
113. Id. at 902; Shapiro, supra note 111, at 142-43.
114. White, 669 A.2d at 898.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 902-03 & n.6.
117. Id. at 898.
118. Id. at 902; Shapiro, supra note 111, at 142-43.
119. White, 669 A.2d at 902-03 & n.6.
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circumstances White could not have accessed the vehicle to destroy
20
evidence or threaten officers, the court held the vehicle search invalid.1
In State v. Pierce,12 1 the New Jersey Supreme Court also declined to
implement Belton broadly. In Pierce, Officer Rette stopped a vehicle
driven by Grass containing two passengers, Pierce and Bemardo.' 22 During
the stop, Officer Rette discovered that Grass's license had been
suspended. 123 Officer Rette removed Grass from the vehicle, searched him,
handcuffed him, and placed him in a police car. 124 Officer Rette then
ordered Pierce and Bernardo out of the vehicle, requested identification, and
searched them for weapons. 125 After additional officers arrived, Officer
Rette left Grass and Bernardo at the rear of the vehicle with the other
officers and performed a search of the vehicle. 126 He discovered a large
knife, a .357 magnum handgun, and a bag containing traces of cocaine
within the pocket of Pierce's jacket. 127 The officers then arrested Pierce
and Bernardo, and the three were indicted for unlawful possession of a
weapon without a permit, receiving stolen property, and possession of
cocaine.1 28 The trial court denied Pierce's motion to suppress the evidence
obtained during the vehicle search, and she pled guilty to cocaine
129
possession.
Pierce appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the court held that
under the New Jersey Constitution, "Belton shall not apply to warrantless
arrests for motor-vehicle offenses."' 130 The court noted that Chimel's twin
rationales justifying the Belton holding were diminished in the context of an
automobile stop for a traffic violation since most vehicle stops involve
unarmed drivers. 13 1 Further, officers remove and secure drivers after
arrest, 132 and "the officer's justification for searching the vehicle and the
passengers' clothing and containers is minimal." 133 Thus, the court
declined to interpret Belton broadly and suppressed the cocaine.

120. Id. at 902; Shapiro, supra note 111, at 143 ("Chimel's two justifications of
preventing access to weapons and the destruction of evidence permit only the search of the
immediate area occupied by the arrestee during his custody.").
121. 642 A.2d 947 (N.J. 1994).
122. Id. at 948.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 948-49.
129. Id. at 949. The charges against Bernardo were dismissed and Grass received four
years imprisonment after pleading guilty to possession of a firearm without a permit. Id.
130. Id. at 959.
131. Id. at 960; Shapiro, supra note 111, at 155 ("The court emphasized that the twofold
rationale underlying Chimel is significantly diminished when the basis for the arrest is a

routine violation of a motor vehicle statute.").
132. Pierce, 642 A.2d at 960.
133. Id.
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D. New Standardfor Automobile Searches Incident to Arrest:
Arizona v. Gant
Since Belton, a significant portion of the legal community expressed
dissatisfaction in how lower courts applied the holding. 134 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor noted that "lower court decisions seem now to treat the
ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a
police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin
rationales of Chimel."'135 Further, Justice Scalia advocated for abandoning
the Chimel rationale for justifying Belton searches. 136 Indeed, enough
Supreme Court Justices appeared dissatisfied with Belton that the Court
became receptive to reexamining the holding altogether. 137 Numerous
academics advocated for the Supreme Court to revisit the decision, 138 and
many state supreme courts had rejected the Belton rule. 139 The Supreme
Court noted, "The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes
courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that
140
decision's clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles."'
Thus, twenty-eight years after Belton, the Supreme Court reexamined the
automobile search incident to arrest standard in the landmark case Arizona
v. Gant. In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the lower courts' broad
interpretation of Belton 14 1 and instead established a narrow standard for
42
automobile searches incident to arrest. 1
In Gant, officers received an anonymous tip that individuals sold illegal
drugs at a house in Tucson, Arizona. 143 When officers approached the
house, Gant answered the door and informed the officers that the house's
owner would return later. 144 The officers left the house and conducted a
background check revealing that Gant's driver's license had been
suspended and Gant had an outstanding warrant for driving without a
45
license. 1

134. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
135. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part).
136. Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a mere
application of Chimel. Rather, it is a return to the broader sort of search incident to arrest
that we allowed before Chimel ....); see also CLANCY, supra note 14, at 361-62.
137. See CLANCY, SUpra note 14, at 361.

138. See Alschuler, supra note 86, at 274-75; LaFave, supra note 83, at 325; Myron
Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and

Belton, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 657, 697; Rudstein, supra note 57, at 1287-88; David S.
Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v.
Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 205-06 (1984); Silk, supra note 74, at 290-94.
139. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
140. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
141. Id. at 1719.
142. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
143. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1714.
144. Id. at 1714-15.
145. Id. at 1715.
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The officers returned to the house that evening and arrested a man for
14 6
providing a false name and a woman for possessing drug paraphernalia.
The officers handcuffed and placed the two individuals in different patrol
cars. 147 Soon after the officers arrested the two individuals, Gant parked a
car in the driveway and exited the vehicle. 148 One of the officers
approached Gant, and handcuffed and arrested him for driving without a
license. 14 9 After another police car arrived, the officers placed Gant in the
patrol car and searched his vehicle.' 50 One officer discovered a gun and the
other officer found cocaine in a jacket located in the rear of the vehicle.'51
The officers charged Gant with possession of drug paraphernalia and
possession of a narcotic for sale. 15 2 At trial, Gant moved to suppress the
evidence found during the search, arguing that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment. 153 Gant argued that Belton did not justify the search
since he posed no threat to the officers once the officers had handcuffed and
placed him in a police car. 5 4 Further, because the officers arrested him for
a traffic offense-driving without a license-the officers could not have
expected to find evidence related to the traffic offense during the search. 155
The trial court denied Gant's motion to suppress the evidence, and a jury
156
convicted Gant, who was sentenced to three years in prison.
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court overturned the trial court's
decision. 157 The court held that Belton only concerned "the permissible
scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded that it did not
answer 'the threshold question whether the police may conduct a search
incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure." ' 158 Having ruled that
Belton did not apply, the court noted that Chimel's twin rationales
permitting a search incident to arrest-officer safety and preservation of
evidence-did not justify the search of Gant's automobile. 159 Officers had
secured Gant in the police car; thus Gant did not pose a threat to the officers
or to destroy evidence. 160 In dissent, Justice W. Scott Bales argued that
only the U.S. Supreme Court could overturn Belton. 16 1 Additionally,
Justice Bales offered several alternative Belton rules if the U.S. Supreme
Court reconsidered Belton, including the following: "a Belton search is
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 643 (Ariz. 2007)).
Gant, 162 P.3d at 643.
Id.

161. Id. at 646 (Bales, J., dissenting).
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never justified as 'incident to162arrest' if it occurs after a suspect is
handcuffed outside the vehicle."'
The State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court issued the
landmark Gant decision that narrowed the automobile search incident to
arrest standard. The Court noted that the broad Belton interpretation was
inconsistent with Chimel's twin rationales for permitting searches incident
to arrest. 163 In narrowing the automobile search incident to arrest standard,
the Court held that only two circumstances justified an automobile search
incident to arrest: (1) "the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" 164 or (2)
"it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
165
arrest."
In applying its new standard to the facts, the Gant Court found the search
invalid. 166 The search could not be justified under the first rationale
because officers handcuffed and secured Gant in a police car, and he was
not within reaching distance of the automobile.1 67 Further, because officers
had arrested Gant for driving without a license prior to the search, the
search could not be justified under the second rationale because the officers
could not reasonably believe the vehicle contained evidence of that
168
crime.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia advocated for completely
abandoning the Belton rationale of officer safety to justify automobile
searches incident to arrest. 169 He noted that officers "virtually always have
a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety-and a
means that is virtually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from
the vehicle, patting him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing
him in the squad car." 170 Further, Justice Scalia argued that automobile
searches conducted after officers place a handcuffed arrestee in a police car

162. Id. at 649.
163. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. In addition, the Court noted that a broad Belton
interpretation directly conflicted with the Belton opinion. Id. (noting that the Belton opinion
specifically stated that it "'in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."'
(quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981))).
164. Id. Subsequently in the opinion, the holding does not mention "unsecured" and
states only "if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search." Id. at 1723. The Court noted "it will be the rare case in which an officer
is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee's
vehicle remains." Id. at 1719 n.4. However, several courts have ruled on this issue within
the past year. See infra Part II.
165. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723.
166. Id. at 1719.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 1725 ("In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-Thornton
charade of officer safety and overrule those cases.").
170. Id. at 1724.
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do not increase officer safety. 17 1 Indeed, Arizona failed to provide an
example of a previously restrained arrestee who escaped and injured an
72
officer with a weapon retrieved from the arrestee's vehicle.1
Additionally, Justice Scalia noted that the majority opinion did not provide
sufficient guidance to officers and that the standard could be
manipulated. 17 3 In contrast to the majority, he argued that an automobile
search incident to arrest is "'reasonable' only when the object of the search
is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime
that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred."' 174 Nonetheless,
Justice Scalia decided to join the majority opinion rather than leave the
175
Court with a fractured and uncertain 4-1-4 decision.
In dissent, Justice Alito provided several arguments against the majority
opinion. He noted the majority had overruled Belton without providing an
adequate justification for declining to apply stare decisis. 176 Additionally,
he argued that because the Court overruled Belton, the Court should also
reexamine Chimel since Belton was an extension of Chimel.177 Finally,
Justice Alito argued that the second prong of the Gant test advocated for by
Justice Scalia "raises 178
doctrinal and practical problems that the Court makes
no effort to address."'
In Gant, the Court rejected the broad interpretation of Belton and
narrowed the automobile search incident to arrest standard. 179 The Court
held that officers could only perform an automobile search incident to arrest
when either the arrestee was unsecured 180 or it was reasonable to believe
the automobile contained evidence related to the arrest. 18 1 While the
holding provides guidance regarding when officers may search an
automobile incident to arrest, Gant also raises several new issues,
including
82
the circumstances required to consider an arrestee secured.1
171. See id. (stating that the threat to officer safety "is not at all reduced by allowing a
search of the stopped vehicle after the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car").
172. See id. ("I observed in Thornton that the government had failed to provide a single
instance in which a formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own
vehicle[;] . . . Arizona and its amici have not remedied that significant deficiency in the
present case." (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004))). But see infra
notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
173. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 ("I believe that this standard fails to provide the needed
guidance to arresting officers and also leaves much room for manipulation, inviting officers
to leave the scene unsecured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) in order to
conduct a vehicle search.").
174. Id. at 1725.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1726, 1728-29 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that law enforcement relied on
Belton, no changed circumstances justified a departure from Belton, Belton still provided a
workable rule, and subsequent cases had not undermined Belton).
177. Id. at 1731.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 1719 (majority opinion).
180. Id.

181. Id. at 1723.
182. See Dale Anderson & Dave Cole, Search & Seizure After Arizona v. Gant, ARIZ.
AT'VY, Oct. 2009, at 14, 17; see also Joanne Eldridge, Colorado Automobile Searches After
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E. Law Enforcement Considerations
This section first reviews techniques officers employ when conducting a
search incident to arrest. This Note draws upon this discussion to develop
and support the proposed test for determining whether officers secured an
arrestee under Gant.i8 3 This section then discusses the significant dangers
that officers confront when performing a search incident to arrest. The
proposed test in Part III takes into account officer safety concerns and the
184
threat that arrestees pose to officers during a search incident to arrest.
1. Search Incident to Arrest Procedures
Law enforcement agencies do not make officer training materials
available to the general public in order to prevent criminals from learning
the strategies officers use to combat crime. 185 Thus, there are few sources
available regarding how officers are trained to perform a search incident to
arrest. 186 Professor Myron Moskovitz conducted one of the few studies on
police procedures by requesting information from over one hundred law
enforcement agencies. 187 He "received enough information to conclude
that, in general, police officers are taught to handcuff an arrestee (preferably
behind his back) before searching the area around him." 188 Indeed, several
law enforcement agencies specifically responded that officers should
189
handcuff an arrestee before conducting a search.
Professor Moskovitz's study also investigated law enforcement
procedures in performing an automobile search incident to arrest. 190 "Not a
Arizona v. Gant, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 25, 30 ("What does it mean for a vehicle to be
'within reaching distance'? Does there need to be some risk that a suspect can get inside and
drive away . . . ?"); Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_1 9-2009_04 25.shtml#1240327427 (Apr. 21,
2009, 11:23 EST) [hereinafter Kerr, Apr. 21 ]. An additional issue raised by Arizona v. Gant
includes the standard for "reasonable to believe." See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_19-2009 04_25.shtml#1240453456
(Apr. 22, 2009, 23:51 EST) [hereinafter Kerr, Apr. 22].
183. See infra Part III.
184. See infra Part III.
185. See Moskovitz, supra note 138, at 663.
186. See id. (discussing the difficulty in obtaining police officer training materials).
187. See id. at 663-64.
188. Id. at 665; Myron Moskovitz, The Road to Reason: Arizona v. Gant and the Search
Incident to Arrest Doctrine, 79 Miss. L.J. 181, 183 (2009) ("I asked police departments
around the country what they tell their officers to do with the suspect after an arrest. The
response was pretty much unanimous: 'Cuff him and get him out of there."').
189. Moskovitz, supra note 138, at 665-66 & nn.30-34 (discussing responses from
several law enforcement agencies-including the Baltimore County Police Department,
Boston Police Academy, Boston Police Department, Illinois State Police, and Kansas City
Police Department-instructing that officers should handcuff and incapacitate the arrestee
prior to performing a search incident to arrest); see also id. at 665-66 & n.32 ("'A search
should not be initiated in arrest situations until the individual is handcuffed and incapacitated
as much as possible."' (quoting BALT. COUNTY POLICE DEP'T, EMPLOYMENT & BASIC
TRAINING DIv., LESSON PLAN:

(2000))).
190. See id. at 675-76.

SELF DEFENSE TACTICS, SEARCHING AND PAT DOWNS 1

20101

A FRAMEWORK FOR ARIZONA v. GANT

2597

single respondent said or even suggested that a police officer should search
a vehicle while the arrestee is in the vehicle or unsecured."' 191 Indeed,
many responses specifically mentioned that an officer should secure the
92
suspect before performing an automobile search incident to arrest. 1
Gant permits officers to search an automobile incident to arrest if the
officers did not secure the arrestee prior to the search.' 93 As evident from
Professor Moskovitz's study, however, officers are instructed to secure the
arrestee before performing a search incident to arrest.1 94 Thus, Gant may
conflict with common police practices as the holding could create "a
perverse incentive for officers to leave arrestees unsecured, in order to
justify searches of the arrestees' vehicles."' 195 Furthermore, officers could
manipulate Gant by leaving an arrestee unsecured in order to justify a
search incident to arrest.' 96 This Note proposes a solution to these potential
issues. 197

2. Officer Safety
Police officers have an inherently dangerous job, and an arrest presents
an extremely unsafe situation. 198 Indeed, between 1999 and 2008, 122 of
the 530 police officers in the United States who were feloniously killed
were killed during an arrest situation. 199 In addition, of the approximately
191. Id. at 676.
192. See id. at 675-76 & nn.86-92 (listing responses from several law enforcement
agencies-including the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission, Kansas
City Police Department, North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety,
New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Oakland Police Department, and Sacramento
Police Department-instructing that officers should take steps such as removing vehicle
occupants, standing near arrestees, or handcuffing arrestees in order to secure arrestees
before performing a vehicle search incident to arrest); see also id. at 675 & n.86 ('A vehicle
search shall not be done until all occupants of the vehicle have been secured."' (quoting
SACRAMENTO, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, SEARCH MANUAL

RM 526.01, at 28 (n.d.))).

193. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
194. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
195. Jeffrey B. Welty, ConstitutionalLimits on Officers' Authority To Search Vehicles,
POPULAR GOv'T, Fall 2009, at 22, 23.
196. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the standard "leaves
much room for manipulation, inviting officers to leave the scene unsecured (at least where
dangerous suspects are not involved) in order to conduct a vehicle search"); Craig M.
Bradley, Two and a Half Cheers for the Court, TRIAL, Aug. 2009, at 48, 49 ("[T]he Court
seems to invite the police to engage in the dubious practice of leaving the arrestee
,unsecured' and 'within reaching distance of the passenger compartment' so that they can
search the car."').
197. See infra Part III.
198. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) ("Every arrest must be presumed to
present a risk of danger to the arresting officer."); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
234 n.5 (1973) ("The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty ....
").
199. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED,
2008, at tbl.19 (2009), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2008/data/table-19.html [hereinafter
FBI TABLE 19] (arrest situations including "Burglary in progress/pursuing burglary suspect,"
"Robbery in progress/pursuing robbery suspect," "Drug-related matter," and "Attempting
other arrest").
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58,000 police officers in the United States who were assaulted in 2008,
approximately 10,000 were assaulted during an arrest situation.2 00 Traffic
stops also present a significant danger to police officers. 20 1 Between 1999
2 02 and during 2008,
and 2008, 101 officers were killed during traffic stops,
203
over 6000 officers were assaulted during traffic stops.
These statistics confirm that arrests and traffic stops present significant
dangers to police officers. 20 4 As a result, officers take precautions such as
handcuffing arrestees to reduce the potential threat. 20 5 However, merely
handcuffing an arrestee and placing the arrestee in a police car does not
always neutralize the danger. 20 6 Indeed, though unusual, handcuffed
arrestees have escaped from the backseat of police cars and injured
2 07
officers.
The Court in Gant narrowed the search incident to arrest standard,
holding a broad Belton interpretation was unnecessary to promote officer
safety. 20 8 Nevertheless, the Court still considered officer safety a
significant issue, and Gant permits an automobile search incident to arrest
when the arrestee is unsecured. 209 The test offered in this Note for
determining whether officers secured an arrestee under Gant also accounts
200. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED,

2008, at tbl.69 (2009), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2008/data/table_69.html [hereinafter
FBI TABLE 69] (arrest situations including "Burglary in progress/pursuing burglary suspect,"
"Robbery in progress/pursuing robbery suspect," and "Attempting other arrest").
201. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977); see also Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits at 24, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542).
202. FBI TABLE 19, supra note 199.
203. FBI TABLE 69, supra note 200.
204. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
206. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 16, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542) ("In
2007 alone there were at least ninety-three reported instances of handcuffed arrestees
escaping after being secured in the back seat of a police car." (citing OkI. Highway Patrol,
Trooper Trap: 2007-Publicized Escapes, http://www.oktrooper.com/examples-2007.html
(last visited 2008))). There are several recent examples in the news of handcuffed
individuals escaping. See Bill Braun, Felon Given Life Term for Arson, TULSA WORLD, Nov.
21, 2009, at A10; Stephanie Farr, 3 Killed, 2 Injured in Weekend Violence, PWILA. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, at 14.

207. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1144-46 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
handcuffed suspect placed in the backseat of a police car escaped from car and confronted
officers); United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 210 & n.60 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
additional examples where handcuffed arrestees killed officers); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23 n.2, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542)
(citing examples of handcuffed arrestees escaping police car and harming officers). But see
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Government in Thornton v.
United States "failed to provide a single instance in which a formerly restrained arrestee
escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle" (citing Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615, 626 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Gant, 129
S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542) (noting that none of the ninety-three handcuffed arrestees cited
from 2007 had injured an officer with a weapon retrieved from their car after escaping from
a police vehicle).
208. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721. For a discussion of additional reasons why the Court
narrowed the Belton standard, see Part I.D.
209. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
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for officer safety. 2 10 While part one of the test considers an arrestee
secured once officers handcuff the arrestee, part two of the test permits
officers to perform a search if a handcuffed arrestee escapes and officer
2 11
safety is at stake.
F. "Arrest" Definitions and Relevance to Gant
In order to conduct a valid search incident to arrest under Gant, by
definition, officers must first arrest the individual. 212 Indeed, "[i]n order to
search incident to arrest, the arrest itself must be a full custodial arrest, and
2 13
a valid arrest made by an officer with authority to make the arrest.
However, whether an alleged search incident to arrest is valid may be
difficult to determine since there is no agreed-upon definition for the term
arrest. 2 14 The Fourth Amendment does not contain the term arrest, 2 15 and
the Supreme Court has provided several definitions. 2 16 The following
section reviews the various requirements of an arrest, discusses Supreme
Court precedent regarding the arrest definition, and reviews the Supreme
Court decision California v. Hodari2 17 to describe how an arrestee can be
considered not secured.
1. Requirements of an "Arrest"
Courts have provided various arrest definitions, 2 18 but they generally
agree on several requirements for an arrest. In order to arrest a suspect, an
officer must seize the suspect. 2 19 An officer seizes a suspect when the
officer either exerts physical control over the suspect, 22° or the suspect
submits to the officer "in response to a show of authority that a reasonable
person would interpret as a demonstration of the officer's intent to
seize." 22 1 Courts have held that officers seized a suspect in numerous
210. See infra Part III.
211. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
212. INGA L. PARSONS, FOURTH AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 123 (2005).

213. Id.
214. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 222; JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 16.12,
at 877 (3d ed. 2009) ("No formula exists for determining the precise moment an arrest has

occurred for purposes of the search incident doctrine.").
215. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CLANCY, SUpra note 14, at 220.
216. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 222 ("Remarkably, the Supreme Court has never defined
the word arrest with any precision .....
217. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
218. See infra notes 230-46 and accompanying text.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (1965); CLANCY, supra note
14, at 226; 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 23:2

(2d ed. 2009); RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.05[1], at 2-192.3.
220. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626; RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.03[1], at 2-32 ("A 'seizure'
of the person occurs when a police officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority,
terminates or restrains [a person's] freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied."' (quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007))).

221. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 153; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03
(1983) (discussing the fact that officers seized defendant and he was not free to leave);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("[A] person has been 'seized'
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situations including when officers formally arrested and processed a suspect
at a police station, 2 22 performed 2 a24 traffic stop, 223 or briefly detained a
suspect for investigatory purposes.
Courts and authorities agree that not every seizure constitutes an
arrest. 225 To arrest an individual, the officer must have probable cause that
the suspect performed or is performing an illegal activity. 226 A brief
investigatory stop-a seizure performed with less than probable causemay be performed under reasonable suspicion. 227 Additional factors that
determine whether a seizure constitutes an arrest or an228investigatory stop
include the length of the stop and the extent of intrusion.
2. Inconsistency in "Arrest" Definitions
Since 1968, the Supreme Court has decided numerous cases concerning
arrests in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 229 However, the Court has

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.").
222. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.03[1], at 2-39 &
n.3 1.
223. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 263; RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.03[1], at 2-39 & n.31.1.
224. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969); RUDSTEIN, supra note 76,
§ 2.03[1], at 2-39 to 2-40 & n.32.
225. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-16 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16;
CLANCY, SUpra note 14, at 218; RUDSTEN, supra note 76, § 2.05[l], at 2-192.3.

226. RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.05[2], at 2-192.5 ("Probable cause to arrest an
individual exists where the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a reasonably
prudent person in believing that the individual has committed or is committing an offense.");
PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIzuRE LAW: A FOURTH AMENDMENT

HANDBOOK 187 (2005).
227. CLANCY, supra note 14, at 479 ("Articulable suspicion is 'considerably less' than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. It is 'obviously less demanding'
than probable cause." (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989))); see also id. at 478 n.77 ("'Reasonable' suspicion and
'articulable' suspicion are equivalent terms."); HUBBART, supra note 226, at 187; Dana M.
Van Beek, Note, United States v. Bloomfield: Handcuffing Law Enforcement in Performing
Its Duties and Preventing Crime, 40 S.D. L. REV. 102, 116 (1995) ("[S]ince a stop is a less
intrusive seizure than an arrest, it need only be based on reasonable suspicion.").
228. HALL, supra note 214, § 22.3, at 5 ("Not all contact between police and citizens
constitutes an arrest, for the police are free to direct questions to a person on the street
without arresting him. Stops on reasonable suspicion are entirely proper, but they cannot be
turned into an arrest without probable cause."); RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.05[1], at 2192.4 ("The difference between a seizure of the person that requires probable cause (an
'arrest') and one that can be undertaken on less than probable cause (an 'investigatory stop')
is 'in the duration and degree of intrusion;resulting from the interference with the person's
freedom of movement."' (quoting People v. Tottenhoff, 691 P.2d 340, 343 (Colo. 1984))).
229. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991);
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200; Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968); Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
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not established a definitive standard for the term arrest. 230 Indeed, the
Court has provided "numerous 'visions' of what constitutes an arrest...
the concept set forth in one case with
with little or no attempt to harmonize
23 1
competing visions in other cases."
Prior to 1968, the Court considered when an arrest had occurred on only
two occasions. 232 These cases followed the common-law view that an
arrest required only two elements: "1) the obtaining of custody over the
2 33
suspect by a police officer; with 2) the intent by the officer to do so." 2 34
Under the common law, essentially all seizures were considered arrests.
The pre-1968 cases appeared to establish that an arrest did not require
officers to book the arrestee at a police station or to declare that the suspect
was under arrest.235
In 1968, the Supreme Court offered differing views of the requirements
of an arrest. In Terry v. Ohio,236 the Supreme Court separated seizures into
two categories-arrests and investigatory stops. 237 One commentator noted
that in distinguishing between the two seizures, the Terry Court
characterized an arrest as involving a trip to the police station and as the
initial step in a prosecution. 238 However, in Peters v. New York, 2 39 the
240
Court characterized an arrest as a seizure supported by probable cause.
Thus, in determining whether the officer arrested the suspect, Peters did not
require the officer to transport the suspect to a police station or to declare
the suspect under arrest. 24 1 Although Chief Justice Earl Warren authored
both Terry and Peters, "the two opinions had vastly different visions of an
but Peters
arrest. Terry portrayed an arrest as a trip to a police station
242
seemed to require only a detention based on probable cause."

230. Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth

Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 142 (2003).
231. Id.
232. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); see also Clancy, supra note 230, at 142-43.
233. Clancy, supra note 230, at 141.
234. Id. at 168 ("[A]ny detention under the common law was usually viewed as an
arrest."); Wayne R. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 418 (1984).

235. Clancy, supra note 230, at 144.
236. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
237. Id. at 26 (discussing the differences between an arrest and a brief investigatory stop);
Clancy, supra note 230, at 146-47; supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
238. Clancy, supra note 230, at 147 ("[Flrom Terry comes the vision that an arrest
involves a seizure, a trip to a police station, and is the initial stage -of prosecution of the
crime.").
239. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (argued with Sibron v. New York, and decided in the same
opinion).
240. Id. at 67.
241. Clancy, supra note 230, at 148 ("In Peters, there was no showing that [the officer]
had told the suspect that he was under arrest .... The Court premised the authority to search
based on [the officer's] physical seizure of the suspect, which was supported by probable
cause .... ).
242. Id. at 149.
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The Supreme Court also considered the requirements of an arrest in
Hodari.24 3 In Hodari, the Court held that to constitute an arrest, an officer
must exert physical force over the arrestee, or the arrestee must submit to
the officer's show of authority. 244 Furthermore, in discussing the level of
force required to effect an arrest, the Court noted that an arrest required "the
mere grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority,
whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee. '' 24 5 Thus, under
Hodari an arrest does not require that the officer fully restrain the
246
arrestee.
As evident from the preceding discussion of arrests, the Supreme Court
has articulated several arrest definitions. An automobile search incident to
arrest under Gant is predicated on a valid arrest;24 7 thus the lack of a
definitive arrest definition confuses the analysis for determining whether
such a search is legal. While this Note does not advocate for a specific
arrest definition, the following section demonstrates how the Gant "secure"
prong remains relevant under the arrest definition articulated in Hodari.
3. Distinction Between "Arrest" and "Secure"
Arrestees are not considered secure merely because officers arrest them.
Although several arrest definitions require the officer to exert a degree of
physical control over the arrestee, 24 8 not all arrest definitions require
complete physical restraint. 249 Indeed, the Hodari arrest definition
specifically notes that an arrest does not require the officer to subdue the
arrestee. 250 Hodari only requires that the officer exert a level of physical
force over the arrestee, but the officer is not required to successfully secure
the arrestee to effect an arrest.2 51 Thus an officer can arrest an individual
252
without actually securing the arrestee.
The Gant secure prong remains relevant under the Hodari arrest
definition since Hodari does not require officers to fully secure a suspect at
arrest. 253 Thus, an arrestee could still potentially access the automobile to
destroy evidence or threaten the officer with a weapon. However, the Gant
secure prong is irrelevant under an arrest definition that requires officers to
243. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
244. Id. at 626.
245. Id. at 624; RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.05[1], at 2-192.3 ("An arrest occurs when a
police officer, for the purpose of making an arrest, grasps or applies physical force to an
individual, regardless of whether he succeeds in subduing the individual.").
246. Hodari,499 U.S. at 624 ("'An officer effects an arrest of a person ... by laying his
hand on him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping and
holding him."' (quoting Whitehead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. 495, 501 (1862))).
247. PARSONS, supra note 212, at 123.
248. See supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
250. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624-25.
251. Id. at 626.
252. Id. at 624-25.
253. Id. (stating that an arrest does not require the officer to successfully subdue the
arrestee); see supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
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completely restrain arrestees to eliminate
the possibility of escape, since all
254
arrestees would be considered secure.
II. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF GAN. WHETHER THE ARRESTEE IS
SECURED AND WITHIN REACHING DISTANCE OF THE AUTOMOBILE

The Supreme Court decided Gant roughly one year ago, yet lower courts
have cited the holding over 400 times. 255 Lower courts have cited Gant
over seventy-five times when the validity of a search turned on whether
officers secured the arrestee. 2 56 Additionally, courts have frequently cited
Gant when the validity of a search turned on whether officers could have
reasonably believed the automobile contained evidence related to the
crime, 257 and cited the holding numerous times to remand a case in light of
Gant.258 Clearly, Gant has had a far-reaching impact, yet courts have
inconsistently implemented the new standard. Indeed, one aspect of the
holding that courts have determined inconsistently is whether the arrestee is
secured and within reaching distance of the vehicle. 2 59 The following
courts' inconsistent interpretations of this aspect of the
section reviews
260
Gant holding.

254. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
255. This figure includes cases reported in Lexis Sheppard's report through February 19,
2010.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding search
invalid because officers secured handcuffed defendant in police vehicle); United States v.
Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding search valid since officers
did not secure arrestee due to presence of other vehicle occupants and prior police report);
United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding search invalid
because officers secured handcuffed defendant in police vehicle); United States v. Chavez,
No. 2:09-cr-0033 FCD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116924, at *13-15 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009)
(holding search of vehicle invalid as a search incident to arrest after defendant fled and, thus,
did not pose risk to officers or to destroy evidence); United States v. Kennedy, No. 3:09-cr00055 (VLB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69665, at *8 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding
search invalid because officers secured handcuffed defendant in police vehicle).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Delano, No. 08-30422, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22336, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2009);
United States v. Contreras, No. 08-30247, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22335, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct.
9, 2009); United States v. Bradford, No. 09-CR-71, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110385, at *9
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 5, 2009); United States v. Peoples, No. 1:09-CR-170, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100766, at * 10 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2009); United States v. Sharp, No. 3:09-CR-72,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109717, at *15-17 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2009).
258. See, e.g., Dunson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2155, 2155 (2009); United States v.
Booker, No. 06-3030, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 12419 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 2009).
259. The Government, in arguing Gant, noted the Gant secure prong could be interpreted
inconsistently. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 33-35, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07542). Additionally, after Gant, commentators noted it was uncertain what factors courts
would consider in determining whether officers secured an arrestee. See Anderson & Cole,
supra note 182, at 17; Eldridge, supra note 182, at 30; Kerr, Apr. 21, supra note 182.
260. This Note does not focus on the second prong of the Gant standard, but
disagreement exists regarding whether "reasonable to believe" is equivalent to the Terry
reasonable to believe standard or the probable cause standard. See Kerr, Apr. 22, supra note
182.
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A. Court Held Officers Secured Arrestee
The following section reviews several cases where the court either held
or noted in dicta that the officers secured the arrestee prior to the search.
1. Arrestee Handcuffed
In State v. Carter,26 1 the court held officers secured the defendant and
suppressed evidence obtained during an automobile search incident to
arrest. 262 In Carter,an officer observed the defendant driving suspiciously
at 1:30 a.m. in a neighborhood known for criminal activity. 2 63 The officer
stopped the defendant after noticing the defendant's registration for a
temporary tag was old and worn. 264 After requesting the defendant's
license and registration, the officer discovered the addresses on the license
and registration did not match and the registration had expired. 2 65 The
officer returned to the police car and called for backup. 26 6 Once the
additional officers arrived, they arrested the defendant for the traffic
267
offenses, removed him from the vehicle, and placed him in handcuffs.
The officer sat the defendant on the curb, 268 and another officer remained
nearby the defendant. 2 69 The officer then conducted a search of the vehicle
and discovered torn-up papers that appeared to be a change of address form
for a credit card belonging to a person other than the defendant. 270 Due to
the discovery of the credit card change of address documents, the officers
2 71
charged the defendant, inter alia, with financial identity fraud.
The court held that the search of the defendant's car was unlawful under
Gant and suppressed the evidence obtained during the search. 2 72 The court
found that the officers had secured the defendant before conducting the
search notwithstanding the fact that the officers did not place the defendant
in a police car before conducting the search. 273 Here, the officers
261. 682 S.E.2d 416 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).

262. Id. at 417, 420-21.
263. Id. at 418 (discussing the fact that defendant attempted to evade officer's detection
by changing directions and driving away from the officer).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at418, 421.
268. Id. at 421. The defendant's supplemental brief states that during the search the
defendant sat either in a patrol car or on the curb. See Defendant-Appellant's Supplemental
Brief at 4, Carter, 682 S.E.2d 416 (No. COA07-1156). However, this Note assumes the
defendant sat on the curb during the search since the court described the defendant as sitting
on the curb.
269. The opinion does not state whether the other officer remained near the defendant as
the defendant sat on the curb, but the State's Supplemental Brief notes that the officer "left
[the defendant] in the custody of the backup officer" when he conducted the search of the
vehicle. State's Supplemental Brief Following Remand from the Supreme Court of the
United
270.
271.
272.
273.

States at 4, Carter,682 S.E.2d 416 (No. COA07-1156).
Carter, 682 S.E.2d at 418.
Id.
Id. at417, 420-21.
See id at 421.
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handcuffed the defendant and directed him to sit on a curb near the
vehicle, 274 and one officer remained close to the defendant during the
2 75
search.
2. Arrestee Not Handcuffed
In United States v. Herman,276 an officer stopped the defendant after
observing him drive erratically. 27 7 The officer directed the defendant to
exit the vehicle because the officer suspected the defendant was intoxicated
and might possess a controlled substance. 278 The officer conducted a patdown search and arrested the defendant after discovering a spoon that the
defendant likely used to administer methamphetamine. 279 The officer did
not handcuff or place the defendant in a police car. 2 80 The officer only left
him standing at the rear of the vehicle next to an officer when he searched
28 1
the automobile incident to arrest.
In deciding whether to suppress the evidence, the court specifically noted
that the first justification under Gant did not apply since the officers had
secured the defendant and he was not within reaching distance of the
vehicle. 2 82 However, the officers did not handcuff the defendant or place
him in a police car. 2 83 Instead, the officer performed a pat-down search and
284
left the defendant standing at the rear of the vehicle next to an officer.
3. Arrestee Handcuffed and Placed in Police Car
In Gant, the Supreme Court held that the officers had secured Gant since
the officers handcuffed and placed him in a police car.28 5 In many cases
decided since Gant, lower courts have similarly held that officers secured
the arrestee when the officers handcuffed and placed the arrestee in a police
car.

2 86

274. Id.
275. State's Supplemental Brief Following Remand from the Supreme Court of the
United States, supra note 269, at 4.
276. No. CR-08-146-LRS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83243 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2009).
277. Id. at *5.
278. See id. at *8.
279. Id. at *4-5.
280. Id. at *2.
281. Id.
282. Id. at * 1-2. The court upheld the search, concluding that the officer could have
reasonably believed the vehicle contained evidence of the arresting offense. Id. at * 15-16.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id.
285. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009); see supra notes 166-67 and

accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Megginson, No. 07-4149, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19296,
at *3-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2009); United States v. Lopez, 567 F.3d 755, 757-58 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. German, No. 2:07-CR-1385, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101234, at *4-5
(D.S.C. July 10, 2009).
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B. Court Held Officers Did Not Secure Arrestee
The following section reviews several cases where the court either held
or noted in dicta that the officers had not secured the arrestee prior to the
search.
1. Arrestee Handcuffed
In United States v. Davis, 28 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit upheld the admission of evidence discovered during an automobile
search. 28 8 In Davis, officers misidentified the defendant as the fugitive they
were attempting to apprehend when the defendant exited a building the
fugitive allegedly frequented. 289 After leaving the building, the defendant
drove roughly a half mile before stopping. 290 When the defendant exited
the vehicle, the officers approached the defendant with weapons drawn,
instructed the defendant to get on the ground, and then handcuffed and
frisked the defendant. 29 1 One officer brought the defendant to his feet and
controlled him, while the other officer looked in the front windshield to
determine whether the vehicle contained any passengers. 292 After failing to
identify any passengers through the front window, the officer looked
through the open car door for other passengers. 293 The officer saw a
handgun in the cup holder and informed the defendant he was under
arrest.294 Upon reviewing the defendant's identification, the officers
295
discovered the defendant was not the fugitive.
The officers charged the defendant with being a felon in possession of a
firearm and with possessing a stolen weapon. 296 The Sixth Circuit denied
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the
search, holding the officers were permitted to stop the defendant since they
reasonably believed the defendant was the fugitive. 297 While the defendant
did not challenge the search under Gant, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless
noted in dicta that the search would be valid under Gant.298 The court
discussed that the defendant could have still accessed the vehicle since the

287. No. 07-4163, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17783 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009).
288. Id. at *4.

289. Id. at *1-2.
290. Id. at *2.
291. Id.

292. Id. at *2-3. The court noted that the vehicle had dark tinted windows, and the
officer did not identify any passengers through the front windshield. Id. at *2.
293. Id. at *3.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *4-5.
298. Id. at *7-8 n.2. The Court noted that this search was a protective search incident to
an investigative detention (rather than incident to arrest) and that they did not determine here
whether the Gant search incident to arrest analysis applied to such searches. However,
assuming Gant did apply, the defendant could have accessed his car. Id.
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officers had not placed the defendant in the police car. 299 Thus, if the court
had applied the Gant analysis, the court would have upheld the search since
the officers had not secured the defendant. 30 0 This case is significant
because lower courts may cite the Sixth Circuit's dicta regarding Gant in
support of a finding that officers did not secure a handcuffed defendant. 30'
2. Arrestee Not Handcuffed
In United States v. Robinson,30 2 an officer observed the driver of a
vehicle stare at the officer and act suspiciously. 30 3 The officer stopped and
30 4
arrested the driver after discovering that the driver did not have a license.
After securing the driver in a police car,30 5 the officer instructed the
defendant to exit the vehicle and seized a knife containing a white residue
from the defendant. 30 6 A second officer arrived and during a search of the
30 7
vehicle, the first officer discovered a digital scale with a white residue.
During the search, the defendant was not handcuffed, but the second officer
30 8
stood next to the defendant at the rear of the vehicle.
The court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence the
officers discovered during the search on several grounds, including the
search incident to arrest standard under Gant.30 9 The court held that the
search was justified under Gant since the officers had not secured the
defendant. 3 10 Before the search the officers did not handcuff the defendant

299. Id. However, the officers handcuffed the defendant and an officer controlled him.
Id. at *2-3.
300. Id. at *7-8 n.2.
301. But see United States v. Sullivan, No. 3:09-CR-28-R, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125207, at *33-34 n.8 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2009) (report and recommendations of magistrate
judge) (declining to rely on dicta from United States v. Davis to conclude that the handcuffed
arrestee was unsecure because he was near the vehicle), declined adoption on other grounds,
United States v. Sullivan, No. 3:09-CR-28, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7312 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 29,
2010).
302. No. 1:08-CR-74-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60467 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2009).
303. See id. at *3.
304. Id. at *3-4.
305. Id. at *4.
306. Id. at *5.
307. Id. at *7, *30-31.
308. Id. at *6, *38.
309. Id. at *1, *35-36 & n.4 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007))
(holding passengers may challenge the validity of a vehicle search during a traffic stop).
310. Id. at *38-39. Similar to United States v. Robinson, the court in State v. Gilbert,
2009-Ohio-5528 (Ohio Ct. App.), determined whether officers secured the defendants prior
to a search in a situation involving multiple defendants and friends of the defendants at the
scene. See id.
5-6. After stopping a vehicle containing four people, the officers arrested
the driver for driving without a license and arrested another passenger for an outstanding
warrant for robbery. Id. The officers removed the defendant and another occupant from the
car and performed a pat-down search. Id. 6. The officer left the defendant and the other
occupant without handcuffs next to an officer as other officers searched the car. Id. In
contrast to Robinson, the court held the officers had secured all of the vehicle occupants. See
id. 33. The court may have reached a different result in Gilbert since, unlike Robinson, the
officers had not arrested the defendant before the search. Id. 6. However, the officers may
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or place him in a police car 31 1: The defendant stood at the rear of the
vehicle next to an officer, but he could have possibly accessed the vehicle to
grab a weapon. 3 12 In addition, the defendant's sister and girlfriend stood
near the vehicle and distracted the officers. 3 13 Further, the
defendant did
3 14
not cooperate with the officers during the pat-down search.
III. ANALYSIS To DETERMINE WHETHER OFFICERS SECURED ARRESTEE

As discussed in Part I1, courts have applied Gant inconsistently when
determining whether officers secured an arrestee before conducting an
automobile search incident to arrest. 3 15 Part III offers an analytical
framework to determine whether officers secured an arrestee.
In order to determine whether an officer secured an arrestee, courts
should apply the following two-part test. First, an arrestee is considered
secure if the officer handcuffed the arrestee. 3 16 Second, assuming the
officer did not handcuff the arrestee, 3 17 the court should consider several
factors to determine whether the officer secured the arrestee, including the
distance between the arrestee and the area the officers searched; the ratio of
police officers to arrestees; the physical positioning of the officers in
relation to the arrestee and the area searched; how difficult the area was for
the arrestee to access; whether officers physically restrained the arrestee or
attempted to handcuff the arrestee; and whether officers displayed guns.
A. Officers Handcuffed Arrestee
When an officer handcuffs an arrestee courts should consider the arrestee
secure and not within reaching distance of the vehicle. 3 18 Courts should
apply this rule even if the officer did not place the arrestee in a police car
after handcuffing the arrestee. As described in Professor Moskovitz's study
of police procedures, officers are trained to secure an arrestee before
conducting a search incident to arrest. 319 Many law enforcement
organizations that participated in Professor Moskovitz's study noted that
placing an arrestee in handcuffs is an effective means of securing an

not have secured the defendant since after the vehicle search he attempted to escape when
officers searched him for drugs. Id. 9.
311. Robinson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60467, at *38.
312. Id. at *39.
313. Id. at *38-39.
314. Seeid. at *9-12.
315. See supra Part II.
316. For the purposes of this analysis, an arrestee is assumed secure if officers placed the
arrestee in a police vehicle without handcuffs. The analysis and rationale set forth below
apply in both situations.
317. This prong also applies when officers encounter multiple vehicle occupants and are
unable to handcuff all arrestees.
318. In his dissent in State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 649 (Ariz. 2007) (Bales, J., dissenting),
Justice W. Scott Bales offered this rule as a possible alternative to Belton. See supra notes
161-62 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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arrestee. 320 In certain situations when handcuffs are insufficient to secure
an arrestee, the officer also takes other protective measures such as placing
a handcuffed arrestee in a police car. 321 If the officer only handcuffed the
arrestee without placing the arrestee in a police car, it is logical to assume
the officer believed he had secured the arrestee. 322 Following this rationale,
an officer cannot justify an automobile search by arguing he had not
secured a handcuffed arrestee. An officer would not stop and search a
vehicle after handcuffing an arrestee if the officer thought the arrestee
posed a threat. 323 Instead, the officer would continue to secure the arrestee
by taking other protective measures such as placing the arrestee in a police
car. 324 Further, a handcuffed arrestee is not within reaching distance of a
vehicle since the arrestee's arms are immobilized and thus a handcuffed
arrestee cannot reach the vehicle.
B. Officers Did Not HandcuffArrestee
When officers do not handcuff an arrestee, courts should engage in a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether officers secured the arrestee
before the automobile search incident to arrest. Courts should review
several factors to determine whether the overall circumstances indicate that
the officers secured the arrestee. While the following list is not exhaustive,
relevant factors to consider include the following: the distance between the
arrestee and the area the officers searched; 325 the ratio of police officers to
arrestees; 32 6 the physical positioning of the officers in relation to the
arrestee and the area searched; 32 7 how difficult the area was for the arrestee
to access; 328 whether officers physically restrained the arrestee or 0attempted
33
to handcuff the arrestee; 329 and whether officers displayed guns.
The proposed analysis for determining whether officers secured an
arrestee without handcuffs is comparable to several other analyses
regarding whether an arrestee immediately controlled an area under Chimel.
For example, the test is similar to the analysis Justice Brennan offered in his
Belton dissent regarding whether an arrestee immediately controlled a

320. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
323. See Moskovitz, supra note 138, at 676 ("Not a single respondent said or even
suggested that a police officer should search a vehicle while the arrestee is in the vehicle or
unsecured."); supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
324. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 76, § 2.06[4][a], at 2-227 ("[Tlhe failure of the police to
handcuff the arrestee or take other protective measures indicates a lack of apprehension
towards him .... ); supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 58, 106-10, 118-20 and accompanying text.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See supra notes 60, 89-90, 106-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61, 106-10, 118-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62, 89-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59, 89-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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vehicle. 33 1 Additionally, the test is similar to Professor David S. Rudstein's
3 32
argument for reexamining Belton published several years prior to Gant.
The analysis is also comparable to the analysis used by courts to determine
3 33
whether an area was in the arrestee's immediate control under Chimel.
Furthermore, the test draws upon the analyses used by courts that narrowly
interpreted Belton. 334 Each of these fact-specific analyses review several
factors in order to determine whether the overall circumstances indicate that
the officers secured the. arrestee or whether the area was within the
335
arrestee's immediate control.
C. Benefits and PotentialCriticismsof the Two-Part Test
The two-part test does not entirely establish a bright-line rule since part
two requires courts to weigh several factors in determining whether officers
secured an arrestee without handcuffs. However, a majority of the cases
will be resolved under part one of the test, since most officers are trained to
handcuff a suspect before conducting a search incident to arrest. 336 Since
part one establishes a bright-line rule regarding handcuffed arrestees,
the
337
overall analysis will provide many of the benefits of a bright-line rule.
In addition to offering guidance for deciding the rare case when officers
do not handcuff an arrestee, the two-part test also ensures that Gant does
not encourage officers to leave an otherwise secured arrestee without
handcuffs in order to justify a search. 338 As discussed in Part I, the Gant
holding could create perverse incentives by encouraging officers to leave
nonthreatening arrestees unsecured in order to justify a search.3 39 However,
under the proposed analysis, if officers did not handcuff a nonthreatening
arrestee in order to justify a search, a court would determine that officers
had secured the arrestee under part two of the test.340 Thus, the two-part
test prevents this potential problem.
Critics of the two-part test may argue that it prevents officers from
making quick decisions and that the test negatively impacts officer safety.
However, the two-part test accounts for officer safety in several ways.
Officers are always permitted to search incident to arrest if the arrestee is
331. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. Additionally, a commentator has
suggested that courts review Justice Brennan's factors for guidance in determining whether
officers secured an arrestee without handcuffs. See Eldridge, supra note 182, at 30.
332. Professor David S. Rudstein also advocated for an approach more consistent with
Chimel, and similar to the rationale offered by Justice Brennan in his Belton dissent. See
supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 54-62, 87-90, 98-133 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of bright-line
rules, including providing officers clear guidance and easy-to-apply rules for determining
whether a search is permissible, and informing citizens of their rights).
338. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text.
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unsecured in order to ensure officer safety and preserve evidence. As
previously discussed, the test only restricts a search after an officer
341
handcuffs an arrestee since handcuffs typically secure an arrestee.
Further, officers may search incident to arrest when they are unable to
handcuff or secure an arrestee. Additionally, in the rare situation where an
arrestee escapes handcuffs and threatens an officer, 34 2 a search would be
justified since the arrestee is no longer secure.
Critics may also argue that the test could encourage officers to
manipulate Gant by not handcuffing arrestees to justify a search. However,
part two of the test prevents such perverse incentives. Under part two, a
court could find that officers secured the arrestee due to other factors
including the arrestee's ability to access the vehicle, 343 the officer-toarrestee ratio, 344 the positioning of officers in relation to the arrestee, 345 or
346
the distance between the arrestee and the area searched.
Finally, critics may argue that the two-part test is unnecessary since
courts already review many of the factors advocated here when determining
whether officers secured an arrestee. However, the two-part test offers
courts an organized framework for considering the various factors. Further,
the two-part test ensures Gant's secure prong remains relevant by
preventing courts and347 officers from presuming an arrestee has
"superhuman" qualities
such as the ability to access weapons in an
348
automobile after being handcuffed.
In Gant, the Court held that Chimel's twin rationales of officer safety and
evidence preservation 349 permit an automobile search incident to arrest if
the arrestee is unsecure and within reaching distance of the vehicle. 350
However, Gant did not provide a framework for determining whether
officers secured an arrestee, and courts are inconsistently applying the
holding.35 1 The two-part test outlined here provides an analysis for
determining whether the arrestee is secure and is consistent with Chimel
because the test prohibits searches where the arrestee is secured-and thus
unable to destroy evidence or injure officers.
D. Application of the Two-Part Test
The following section applies the two-part test to cases discussed in Part II.

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62, 87-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60, 87-90, 106-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61, 106-10, 118-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58, 106-10, 118-20 and accompanying text.
Cf supra notes 106-10.
See supra Part I.B. 1.
See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.

2612

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

1. State v. Carter
A court applying the two-part test to Carter would find the officers
secured the defendant. Under part one of the test, the officers had secured
the defendant since the officers placed the defendant in handcuffs before the
search. 352 Assuming the officers did not handcuff the defendant, the
defendant would still be considered secure under part two of the test. The
officers outnumbered the defendant two to one, and one officer remained
close to the defendant while the defendant sat on a curb during the
3 53
search.
2. United States v. Herman
If a court applied the two-part test to the facts of Herman, the court
would find that the officers had secured the defendant prior to the search.
354
Since the officers did not handcuff or place the defendant in a police car,
the court would review the factors under part two of the test. In Herman,
the officers outnumbered the defendant two to one, the defendant stood at
the rear of the vehicle, an officer stood next to the defendant during the
search, and the defendant and the officers did not struggle. 355 Thus, the
overall circumstances indicate that the officers secured the defendant prior
to the search.
3. Arizona v. Gant
A court applying the two-part test to Gant would determine that under
part one of the test, the officers secured the arrestee since the officers
3 56
handcuffed and placed the arrestee in a police car.
4. United States v. Davis
If a court applied the two-part test to Davis, the court would determine
that officers secured the defendant. The officers had placed the defendant
in handcuffs, 357 and thus they had secured the defendant under part one of
the test. Assuming the officers had not placed the defendant in handcuffs,
the defendant would still be considered secure under part two of the test
since the officers outnumbered the defendant two to one, they approached
the defendant with weapons drawn, during the search one officer controlled
the defendant, and the officers did not struggle to subdue the defendant. 358

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
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5. United States v. Robinson
Under the two-part test, the defendant in Robinson would not be
considered secure. Since the officers did not handcuff or place the
defendant in a police car, the case falls under part two of the test. Here, the
defendant stood at the rear of the vehicle without handcuffs, the defendant
and relatives outnumbered the officers, the defendant's sister and girlfriend
distracted the officers, and the officers had discovered that the defendant
possessed a knife. 359 Thus, the overall circumstances indicate the officers
had not secured the defendant and he still posed a threat.
CONCLUSION

In Gant, the Supreme Court narrowed the permissible scope of an
automobile search incident to arrest to two circumstances: (1) when an
arrestee is not secured or (2) it is reasonable for officers to believe the
vehicle might contain evidence related to the crime of the arrest. The Gant
decision raises several new issues including the circumstances required to
consider an arrestee secure. As this Note discussed, lower courts have
inconsistently interpreted the Gant secure prong. Due to the inconsistent
application of Gant, defendants will receive unequal treatment and officers
will be uncertain regarding the criteria required to consider an arrestee
secured. Courts should resolve these issues by adopting an analytical
framework similar to the two-part test offered in this Note.

359. See supra notes 305-14 and accompanying text.
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